We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a preference revelation mechanism to be monotone strategyproof if declaring a "more truthful" preference ordering dominates (with respect to the true preferences) declaring a "less truthful" preference ordering. Our main result states that a mechanism is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof.
Introduction
Truthful revelation is a primary goal in mechanism design. Ideally, it is a dominant strategy to truthfully reveal one's preferences, and a mechanism that induces such a dominant strategy for all agents and all preference profiles is said to be strategyproof. Non-trivial strategyproof mechanisms do not always exist if other desired properties are also imposed (Gibbard (1978) , Satterthwaite (1978) ), but a number of environments have been identified for which nontrivial strategyproof mechanisms exist, e.g. voting, two-sided matching, house allocation, or auctions.
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Strategyproof mechanisms induce a radical division between strategies, for they distinguish the truthful strategy from all other strategies. All non-truthful strategies are deemed undesired regardless of their other characteristics; a lie is a lie, whether big or small. This gave the prior literature little reason to scrutinize misrepresentations in strategyproof mechanisms, for instance by measuring how much they deviate from the truth. We argue that this is an important omission and we focus in this paper specifically on non-truthful strategies in strategyproof mechanisms.
We believe there is a need for a general tool to analyze misrepresentations. There is indeed now growing evidence that strategyproof mechanisms perform poorly in the laboratory (see Chen (2008) for a survey).
2 Actually, experimental data from games with a dominant strategy also exhibit seemingly irrational behavior. 3 Overall, most experimental analysis of strategyproof mechanisms cannot go further than acknowledging the percentage of subjects not being truthful, and analyzing how this percentage varies when changing some environment parameters or the mechanism itself. However, the existing studies have not been able to rank non-truthful strategies on how close they are to the true preferences, save for some specific cases. 4 This is a serious limitation because what makes strategyproof mechanisms appealing is, among other things, their ability to generate quality data about individuals' preferences.
Such information is crucial if one wishes to run counterfactuals and test potential new policies.
Policy makers (and econometricians) may prefer a mechanism with a large percentage of individuals not being truthful but "close" to the truth over a mechanism with a smaller percentage of misrepresentations but consisting of large deviations from the truth.
From a theoretical perspective we argue that studying misrepresentations can help understanding further the anatomy of strategyproof mechanisms. By its definition, strategyproofness imposes the existence of a dominant strategy in the mechanism. But does it also impose any structure on misrepresentations? To address this question we classify misrepresentations so as to be able to rank strategies on how much they misrepresent the true preferences. Our contention is that such a classification must be linked to the cost of misrepresenting preferences. Drawing on the intuition for strategyproofness, small misrepresentations should have a lower impact on agents' welfare than large ones, or, put differently, small deviations should dominate large ones. 5 We call a mechanism satisfying this property monotone strategyproof. One might conjecture that imposing monotonicity between payoffs and distance from the truth would be more restrictive than the usual incentive compatibility, i.e., that some strategyproof mechanisms may not be monotone strategyproof. Our main contribution here is to show that monotone strategyproofness is actually equivalent to strategyproofness.
This seemingly counterintuitive result turns out to be straightforward to show and holds for a very general class of environments.
Our result is derived within a typical environment where each individual has a preference relation over a finite set of alternatives and participates in a strategyproof mechanism. We first devise a measure to compare the degree of preference misrepresentation. Given two preference orderings P i and P i , we define the Kemeny set of P i and P i as the pairs of alternatives that are not ordered in the same way under these two preferences. 6 We compare the degree of misrepresentation by comparing Kemeny sets: Given a true preference ordering P i , an ordering P i is defined to be more truthful than P i when the Kemeny set of P i and P i is a subset of that of P i and P i . That is, P i is more truthful than P i when P i has relatively more elements whose order disagrees with P i . In this context, a mechanism is said to be monotone strategyproof if a more truthful strategy always dominates a less truthful one. 5 See Jackson (1992) for a similar argument in the case of in an exchange economy. 6 The cardinality of this set is the well-known Kemeny distance (Kemeny, 1959) . 7 The equivalent definition for stochastic mechanisms simply replaces dominance with stochastic dominance.
It is straightforward to see that monotone strategyproofness implies strategyproofness. Our main result (Theorem 2) states that the reverse also holds under a mild assumption on the domain of the mechanism. For deterministic social choice functions this equivalence actually holds for any environment (Theorem 1).
We compare strategies by comparing their Kemeny sets. A natural question is whether a non-truthful strategy P i that dominates another non-truthful strategy P i is necessary closer to the true preferences in the way we define it. In other words, is Kemeny set inclusion equivalent to the dominance relation? It turns out that this equivalence is true for deterministic mechanisms, but not for the general case. For non-deterministic mechanisms we show how one preference ordering may dominate another without Kemeny set inclusion. This observation illustrates the complication added by non-deterministic mechanisms.
Two closely related papers are Carroll (2012) and Sato (2013) . Like us, they also compare "large" and "small" misrepresentations, but they address a different question than we do. Both Carroll and Sato characterize conditions under which "local" strategyproofness implies "global" strategyproofness, that is, conditions under which restricting misrepresentations that only switch the ranking of two consecutive alternatives in one's preferences is enough to characterize strategyproofness. So their concern is more about the transitivity of strategyproofness. 8 Another related paper is Cho (2014) . While considering closely related issues to ours, the analysis in Cho (2014) is constrained by a more restrictive environment.
Cho studies probabilistic assignment mechanisms (Carroll, Sato and us consider any social choice mechanism). Cho's main contribution consists of proposing several ways to compare probabilistic assignments, and he shows that Sato's result continue to hold with these new notions of assignment comparison. As a by-product, Cho finds equivalence between monotone strategyproofness (that he calls "lie-monotonicity") and strategyproofness for stochastic mechanisms under specific domain conditions. 9 This result is covered in our Corollary 1.
We obtain results for a more general domain, and also consider deterministic social choice 8 Another, somewhat less related paper, is Pathak and Sönmez (2012) , who also focus on misrepresentation of preferences. However, Pathak and Sönmez are interested in comparing mechanisms-and therefore consider mechanisms that are not strategyproof-while we are interested in comparing misrepresentations under strategyproof mechanisms. 9 Cho's definition of lie-monotonicity is more restrictive than our notion of monotone strategyproofness, as he only compares preference orderings that differ only in the relative ranking of two consecutive alternatives.
Under his domain restriction this turns out to be equivalent to monotone strategyproofness.
functions and mechanisms with cardinal types.
We outline the environment we consider in Section 2. Monotone strategyproofness is defined and shown to be equivalent to strategyproofness in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the relevance of using Kemeny sets to compare strategies and show how similar result can be obtained when agents have cardinal utility functions over outcomes. We conclude in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Let N be a set of agents and X a finite set of alternatives. We shall focus in this paper on the incentives from an individual agent's perspective, henceforth called agent i. 10 A preference P i for agent i over X is a linear order on X. Given a preference relation P i we denote by R i the weak ordering associated with P i , i.e., xR i x implies xP i x or x = x .
11
A preference profile is a list P of preferences for each agent j ∈ N , P = × j∈N P j .
We follow the usual convention to denote by P −i the profile (P 1 , . . . , P i−1 , P i+1 , . . . , P n ). The set of all possible preferences, called the universal domain, is denoted P. A domain is a non-empty subset of P, which does not need to be a product of individual domains.
A domain D is connected if, for any two preference orderings P i , P i ∈ D, there exists a sequence (P 1 , . . . , P ) such that P 1 = P i , P = P i and for each h < l, P h and P h+1 are adjacent. A sequence of preference orderings (P 1 , . . . , P ) satisfies the non-restoration property if whenever for some x, x ∈ X and some h < we have xP h x and x P h+1 x then it implies that x P h x for each h > h + 1.
A lottery is a vector of probabilities π ∈ R |X| such that x∈X π x = 1. We denote by ∆(X) the set of all lotteries over X. A social choice function (or a mechanism) on a domain D is a mapping ϕ : × i∈N D → ∆(X). Given a profile P , we denote by ϕ x (P ) the probability of alternative x under the lottery ϕ(P ). The social choice function is deterministic if for each P ∈ D N , ϕ(P ) is a degenerate lottery. In this case (abusing notation) we shall denote by ϕ(P i , P −i ) the alternative x such that ϕ x (P i , P −i ) = 1.
10 Thus, the set of individuals need not be finite nor countable. 11 Our model only describes the problem from a unique agent's perspective, so one can view an agent i's preferences as a preference ordering over i's individual outcomes. This way our model encompasses private good environments like two-sided matching models, where agents are defined as having preferences over potential partners while an outcome is a matching that involves all agents.
Given preference orderings P i , P i , P i , we say that P i (stochastically) dominates P i with respect to P i , denoted P i P i P i , when
For a deterministic social choice function, condition (1) can be rewritten as
and for each P i , P i ∈ D, P i dominates P i with respect to P i .
Observe that the sets of individuals, the (true) preference profile P , and a social choice function ϕ on a domain D induce a strategic form game Γ ϕ = N, D, P , where N is the set of players, D is the set of (pure) strategy profiles, the outcome of a strategy profile P is given by ϕ(P ), and each player i ∈ N evaluates the outcome ϕ(P ) using his true preferences P i . In this context, a social choice function ϕ is strategyproof if in the game form Γ ϕ the truthful strategy P i is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each player i.
Monotone strategyproofness
One natural way to compare two preference orderings is by counting the number of pairs of alternatives whose relative rank differ between the two orderings. This method is known as the Kemeny distance (Kemeny, 1959) . We propose instead to compare preference orderings with what we call the Kemeny sets of the preference orderings.
Definition 2 Given two preference orderings P i , P i , the Kemeny set of P i and P i is the set of all pairs (x, x ) ∈ X × X that are not ordered identically in P i and P i ,
We are now ready to introduce our main concept:
with respect to P i .
Note that if a social choice function is monotone strategyproof it is obviously strategyproof. Indeed, K(P i , P i ) = ∅ implies that P i dominates any other preference ordering P i .
The next theorem states that the converse also holds for deterministic social choice functions on any domain.
Theorem 1 Let ϕ be a deterministic social choice function on a domain D. Then ϕ is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof.
Proof Let P i , P i and
be any profile, and let x = ϕ(P i , P −i ) and x = ϕ(P i , P −i ) and assume that x = x .
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Observe that if x P i x , then ϕ cannot be strategyproof. This is because if P i were the true preferences, then individual i could benefit by reporting P i instead of P i . Similarly, it cannot be that x P i x . So it must be that x P i x and
we have
Observe that Theorem 1 holds for any domain, but only for deterministic social choice functions. If we want to consider non-deterministic social choice functions a result similar to Theorem 1 can be obtained under certain conditions on the domain. Before presenting those conditions some definitions are in order.
For any two preferences P i and P i we first construct the set of connected components of the graph G(P i , P i ) = (X, K(P i , P i )), where X is the set of vertices and K(P i , P i ) is the set of edges. That is, in the graph G(P i , P i ) there is an edge between x and x if (x, x ) ∈ K(P i , P i ),
i.e., if the relative order of x and x differ between P i and P i . Two alternatives x and x are
component is a set of alternatives
C ⊆ X such that any two alternatives in C are connected in G(P i , P i ) and no alternative in C is connected with an alternative in X\C.
three edges: between x 1 and x 2 , between x 2 and x 4 , and between x 3 and x 5 . The connected components in G(P i , P i ) are {x 1 , x 2 , x 4 } and {x 3 , x 5 }.
For a subset of alternatives C ⊂ X, let P i restricted to C, denoted P i | C , be a preference ordering defined on C such that for any x, y ∈ C, xP i | C y if, and only if xP i y. We say that a 12 If ϕ(P i , P −i ) = ϕ(P i , P −i ) for any profile P −i , then P i and P i are equivalent strategies and thus P i trivially dominates P i .
preference ordering P i is a complete reversal of P i when for any x and y, xP i y if, and only
A domain D is weakly connected if for any two distinct preferences P i and P i there exists a sequence (P 1 , . . . , P k ) that satisfies the non-restoration property where
and for each h < k, and the graph G(P
) has exactly one connected component C, such that either |C| ≤ 3, or P h+1 | C is a complete reversal of P h | C .
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Theorem 2 Let ϕ be a social choice function on a weakly connected domain D. Then ϕ is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof.
The proof of Theorem 2 will invoke the Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 that we present below.
Lemma 1 Let P i , P i and P i be preference orderings, and let C ⊂ X be a unique connected component of the graph
Proof Since C is the unique connected component, P i | X\C = P i | X\C . Let A be the set of alternatives that are above C in P i , A = {x : xP i y for all y ∈ C}. The set C being the unique connected component implies that we also have A = {x : xP i y for all y ∈ C}. Similarly, we can define the set B of alternatives below C, B = X\(A ∪ C) = {x : yP i x for all y ∈ C} = {x : yP i x for all y ∈ C}.
By strategyproofness, P i P i P i and P i P i P i imply that, for any P −i and any
respectively. Since P i | A = P i | A , for each of the above inequalities both sides must be identical. It follows then that ϕ x (P i , P −i ) = ϕ x (P i , P −i ), for each x ∈ A.
Let x 1 be the highest alternative in P i | B (so x 1 is also the highest alternative ranked in
and let x 0 and x 0 be the lowest alternatives ranked in P i | C and P i | C , respectively.
Observe that {x :
we obtain xR i x 1 ϕ x (P i , P −i ) = xR i x 1 ϕ x (P i , P −i ). Therefore, ϕ x 1 (P i , P −i ) = ϕ x 1 (P i , P −i ). 13 We could allow in the definition that two consecutive preference ordering in the sequence, say, P Continuing with the alternatives ranked below x 1 (which are ordred identically in P i and P i )
we then obtain, for each x ∈ B, ϕ x (P i , P −i ) = ϕ x (P i , P −i ).
We now show that P i P i P i , i.e., for any x ∈ X,
Let x be any alternative in X. Since ϕ y (P i , P −i ) = ϕ y (P i , P −i ) for each y / ∈ C,
Moreover,
Summing Eqs. (4) and (5) yields (3), the desired result.
Lemma 2 Suppose P i is a complete reversal of P i . Then for any
and for any stochastic strategyproof mechanism P i P i P i .
Proof
h }, and thus we obviously have K(P i , P i ) ⊆ K(P i , P i ) for any P i . Consider any profile P −i
and let π h , π h and π h denote the probability of alternative x h under the strategy P i , P i and P i , respectively. We need to show that P i P i P i , that is,
. . .
Since there are k alternatives
Note that (a k ) follows directly from (6). For 1 < l ≤ k, observe that Eq. (6) implies that (a l ) is equivalent to 1 − h<l π h ≥ 1 − h<l π h ⇔ h<l π h ≥ h<l π h , i.e., Eq. (a l−1 ).
Lemma 3 Let |X| = 3, and let P i , P i and P i such that K(P i , P i ) ⊂ K(P i , P i ). For any strategyproof social choice function, P i P i P i .
Proof
Let |X| = 3, and let P i , P i and P i such that K(P i , P i ) ⊂ K(P i , P i ). Note that |K(P i , P i )| = 0 implies P i = P i and thus P i P i P i trivially holds.
If |K(P i , P i )| = 1, then the graph G(P i , P i ) has exactly one connected component, say, C = {x, y}, where xP i y and yP i x. Due to Kemeny set inclusion, xP i y. Therefore, P i | C = P i | C and thus P i|C P i|C P i|C is equivalent to P i | C P i |c P i | C . By Lemma 1,
If |K(P i , P i )| = 3 then P i is a complete reversal of P i . By Kemeny set inclusion, it must be that P i = P i . Therefore, P i is a complete reversal of P i , and by Lemma 2, P i P i P i .
Consider now the case when |K(P i , P i )| = 2. By Kemeny set inclusion, either |K(P i , P i )| = 0 or |K(P i , P i )| = 1. In the former case, P i = P i and thus by strategyproofness, P i P i P i .
In the latter case, by Kemeny set inclusion |K(P i , P i )| = 3, i.e., P i is a complete reversal of P i . Then by Lemma 2, P i P i P i .
Proof of Theorem 2
Let P i , P i and P i such that K(P i , P i ) ⊆ K(P i , P i ). Since the domain is weakly connected, there exist a sequence P 1 i , . . . , P i that satisfies the non-restoration property where P i = P 1 i , P i = P i , and for each h < , the graph G(P ) has only one connected component C, such that either |C| ≤ 3 or P h+1 | C is a complete reversal of P h | C .
Notice that the non-restoration property implies that K(P
, P i ). Since the stochastic dominance relation is transitive it is sufficient to show that for any h < we have
Let C be the (unique) connected component of G(P ) and
A domain D is strongly connected if for any two distinct preferences P i and P i there exists a sequence (P 1 , . . . , P k ) that satisfies the non-restoration property where P 1 = P i , P k = P i and for each h < k, and the graph G(P
) has exactly one connected component
14 Sato (2013) showed that the single-peaked domain is strongly connected and Carroll (2012) showed that the (maximal) single-crossing domain is also strongly connected. 15 Note that the universal domain is obviously strongly connected. Clearly, any strongly connected domain is also weakly connected. Therefore, following corollary holds.
Corollary 1 Let ϕ be a social choice function on a strongly connected domain D. Then ϕ is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof.
The next example shows that when the domain is not weakly connected then strategyproofness and monotone strategyproofness are no longer equivalent.
Example 1 Let X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 }, and let D be the domain composed of the three preference orderings depicted in Table 1 . Note that K(P i , P i ) = {(x 3 , x 4 )} and K(P i , P i ) = 
However, the domain D is not weakly connected.
Let ϕ be a mechanism such that, for any P −i , the probability to obtain alternative x ∈ X for each of the preferences in D is given by the Table 2 . It can be verified that ϕ is strategyproof, yet it is not monotone strategyproof as P i P i P i does not hold. Indeed,
4. Discussion
Weak preferences
Until now we have only considered the case of strict preference domains. In this section we question whether our results extend to the case of weak preferences. A weak preference relation R i for agent i over X is a complete, reflexive and transitive binary relation on X.
Given a preference relation R i we denote by P i and I i the corresponding strict and indifference preference relation, respectively. That is, xP i x if xR i x and not x R i x, and xI i x if both xR i x and x R i x hold. We denote by R the domain of all possible preference profiles over X.
The natural extension of the Kemeny set inclusion for weak preference relations -when comparing two preference orderings with respect to a third one-is the notion of intermediate preferences introduced by Grandmont (1978) .
(a) xR i x and xR i x imply xR i x .
(b) xP i x and xP i x imply xP i x .
(c) (xI i x and xP i x ) or (xP i x and xI i x ) imply xR i x .
One easily see that for a triple (P i , P i , P i ) of strict preferences
implies that condition (b) of Definition 4 holds. In this case a natural definition of monotone strategyproofness would be that for any triple of preference relations (R i , R i , R i ) such that R i ∈ (R i , R i ), it holds that R i dominates R i with respect to R i . One could then conjecture that monotone strategyproofness would be equivalent to strategyproofness in this setting.
However, there exist situations where this property does not hold. To see this, let R i ∈ (R i , R i ) such that for some preference profile R −i we have ϕ(R i , R −i ) = x and ϕ(R i , R −i ) =
x , and assume that x = x . Suppose that we have x P i x , x I i x and x I i x . That is, for the pair (x , x ) we have to consider the second part of condition (c) of Definition 4. It is then easy to see that the pair (x , x ) does not violate the fact that R i is between R i and R i , yet we clearly have that R i cannot dominate R i with respect to R i .
In other words, the equivalence between strategyproofness and monotone strategyproofness is not assured when considering indifferences. The reason behind it is that when an agent is indifferent between two alternatives, strategyproofness does not impose any particular selection among these two alternatives. That is, we may well have that under two preferences R i and R i individual i is indifferent between two alternatives, say, x and x , yet
x is strictly preferred to x under R i . Strategyproofness in this case does not impose that alternative x should be chosen over x under either R i or R i for some preference profile P −i .
Comparing preferences
Theorems 1 and 2 show that Kemeny set inclusion captures dominance relations between different strategies in a strategyproof mechanism. One natural question to address is whether the converse also holds, i.e., when a preference ordering P i dominates another ordering P i , is it necessarily the case that K(P i , P i ) is a subset of K(P i , P i )? In other words one may ask whether the partial order over preferences induced by the Kemeny set relation is the weakest possible order such that the equivalence between monotone strategyproofness and strategyproofness holds.
To investigate this question, first note that we may be limited in the set of alternatives we can compare. To see this, suppose that for some alternatives x and y, and preference orderings P i and P i , there is no P −i such that ϕ(P i , P −i ) = x and ϕ(P i , P −i ) = y. If this happens, it is impossible to know how P i and P i compare those two alternatives, and thus we cannot say anything about Kemeny set inclusion. So when comparing two preference orderings P i and P i , we can only consider pairs of alternatives x, y such that, for some P −i , ϕ(P i , P −i ) = x and ϕ(P i , P −i ) = y.
Given a mechanism ϕ, the joint range of two preference orderings P i and P i is the set of pairs of alternatives (v, v ) for which there exists a profile P −i such that ϕ(P i , P −i ) = v and ϕ(P i , P −i ) = v . The joint range of P i and P i for mechanism ϕ is denoted J ϕ (P i , P i ).
Definition 5 Given three preference orderings P i , P i and P i , the Kemeny set of P with respect to P on joint range with P is the set of all pairs (x, x ) ∈ X × X that are not ordered identically in P i and P i and that belong to the joint range of P i and P i , i.e.,
Proposition 1 Let ϕ be a deterministic strategyproof social choice function, and let (P i , P i , P i ) be any triple of preferences. Then P i dominates P i with respect to P i if, and only if,
Proof
The if direction is a direct corollary of Theorem 1. Consider the only if direction, and let P i , P i and P i such that P i P i P i . We need to show that K(P i , P i , P i ) ⊆ K(P i , P i , P i ). So we only need to check the Kemeny set inclusion for the pairs that are in the joint range of P i and P i . Accordingly, let (x, y) be any pairs of alternatives in J ϕ (P i , P i ).
We then have to show that
Observe that if (x, y) / ∈ K(P i , P i ), then Eq. (8) is trivially satisfied. Suppose then that (x, y) ∈ K(P i , P i ). Note that since P i P i P i and x = y imply xP i y. 16 If (x, x ) / ∈ K(P i , P i ) then xP i y, which is equivalent to ϕ(P i , P −i )P i ϕ(P i , P −i ). This contradicts strategyproofness, so yP i x and thus (x, y) ∈ K(P i , P i ).
Kemeny set inclusion (or betweeness) is more restrictive than Kemeny set inclusion on the joint range. The next example illustrates this point with the median voter with single-peaked preferences, where P i dominating P i with respect to P i does not imply that
Example 2 Let ϕ be the standard median voter social choice function, and let the domain be the single-peaked preference domain. It is well known that for the single-peaked domain the median voter rule is strategyproof (Moulin, 1980) . Let L be the order of the alternatives under which the domain is single-peaked. For simplicity, assume here that there is an odd number of individuals.
Let i be an individual and P i his true preferences where x is the most preferred alternative (the peak ) according to P i . Consider now two preference orderings (that are single-peaked under the order L), P i and P i , where x and x are their respective peaks. Suppose that xLx Lx . Then P i dominates P i .
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Suppose that there exists a pair of alternatives, say x 1 and x 2 , such that (
To see this, without loss of generality suppose that ϕ(P i , P −i ) = x 1 and ϕ(P i , P −i ) = x 2 . Consider first the case when x 1 Lx . If x 1 Lx , then by choosing P i instead of P i individual i cannot change the outcome, so x 1 = x 2 , a contradiction. So, x Lx 1 . Using symmetric argument we obtain x 2 Lx . So we have xLx Lx 1 Lx 2 Lx , which contradicts (
similar argument leads to a contradiction, too. It is important to note that (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ K(P i , P i ) and (x 1 , x 2 ) / ∈ K(P i , P i ) does not contradict single-peakedness. So, even though
However, it cannot be that
The result in Proposition 1 does not hold for non-deterministic social choice functions, as the example below shows.
Example 3 Consider a non-deterministic social choice function ϕ and following preference profiles, where the numbers in parenthesis are the probabilities that the corresponding alternative obtains for any profile P −i under ϕ (one can readily verify that in such case ϕ is strategyproof),
It is easy to check that P i P i P i . Yet we have K(P i , P i ) K(P i , P i ).
Cardinal environments
The concept of monotone strategyproofness can be easily adapted to cardinal environments, i.e., when an individual is characterized by a utility vector over the set of alternatives and individuals have expected utility preferences over lotteries. A few more definitions are needed before going further.
A type space is a non-empty subset of × i∈N R |X| , and an individual's type is a vector in R |X| . Given a type space T , a mechanism is a mapping ϕ : T → ∆(X). We denote by u i a generic type of individual i, and u = (u i ) i∈N is a type profile. Given a (true) type profile u and a reported type profile u , the expected utility of individual i is given by the inner product
A mechanism is incentive compatible on a type space T if, for each i ∈ N , for each u ∈ T and each u ∈ T such that
Definition 6 A mechanism is monotone incentive compatible on a type space T if, for each i ∈ N , for each u ∈ T and each u , u ∈ T such that u −i = u −i = u −i and
We can now introduce the counterpart of Theorem 2 for cardinal mechanisms.
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Proposition 2 A mechanism is incentive compatible if, and only if, it is monotone incentive compatible.
Proof
That a monotone incentive compatible mechanism is also incentive compatible is obvious. 19 Consider then an incentive compatible mechanism ϕ on a type space T . Let u i be any admissible type for individual i, and u i , u i such that
Note that if α = 0 or α = 1 then u i = u i or u i and thus we trivially have A straightforward application of Proposition 2 is for incentive compatible auction mechanisms with private values. Consider the case when individuals' types are real numbers (their value of the good to be auctioned). Our result then simply says that if an individual's private value for the auctioned good is, say, x, then bidding x < x dominates bidding x < x .
Conclusions
We showed that for strategyproof mechanisms one can meaningfully compare the extent of preference misrepresentation by comparing pairs of alternatives. We defined the concept (2007) show that when the domain is a subdomain of generalized single-peaked preferences then any strategyproof social choice function takes the form of voting by issues.
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Our results also shed light on the complications that arise when social choice functions are non-deterministic, or are defined on domains with indifferences. Strategyproofness in the non-deterministic case imposes that the truthful strategy stochastically dominates any other strategy. It is well known that the mere existence of a stochastically dominating strategy 20 The similarities between their works and ours stop here. The domains identified by Nehring and Puppe can be very challenging in a general setting, so it is not a surprise that one needs to impose some constraints on the domain to obtain the equivalence between strategyproofness and monotone strategyproofness for stochastic mechanisms. As for the case of domains with weak preferences we encounter stronger hurdles. Our discussion in Section 4.1 indeed suggests that obtaining a similar result for the case of weak preferences seems beyond reach.
